Abstract. Following an idea due to Thomson (Journal of Economic Theory, 1981, 25: 431-441) we examine the role of reference functions in the axiomatic approach to the solution of bargaining problems with and without claims. A reference function is a means of summarizing essential features of a bargaining problem. Axioms like Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Monotonicity are then reformulated with respect to this reference function. Under some weak conditions on the reference function we obtain characterizations of different parametrized classes of solutions. We present several examples of reference functions and thereby recover many well-known solutions to bargaining problems with and without claims.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to provide a unifying approach to the solution of bargaining problems with and without claims. To this end we study the role of reference functions in the definition and axiomatization of bargaining solutions. Reference points like the status quo and the ideal point have ever played an important role in characterizations of bargaining solutions but the first formal introduction of the concept of a reference function in the context of two-person bargaining problems is due to Thomson [12] . A reference point represents an origin from which relative utility gains or losses can be measured and it is meant to summarize features of the bargaining problem that are regarded as essential, either by the players or by some impartial arbitrator.
In this paper we examine reference functions mainly in the context of nperson bargaining problems with claims. Solutions to this class of problems also utilize reference points like the status quo and the claims point. And, as in the case of traditional bargaining problems, we might wish to use more general reference points that, for example, take into account some properties of the feasible set. Thus, like Thomson [12] , we consider very general reference functions and show how solutions to bargaining problems with claims can be classified apart from differences in the reference function. By formulating axioms like Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Monotonicity with respect to the given reference function g we obtain characterizations of three different classes of solutions, all parametrized by g: Nash-, egalitarianand proportional-type solutions. In this way we can point out the common features between several solutions that have been analyzed independently of each other so far.
Although our focus is on bargaining problems with claims, as a corollary we obtain characterization results for solutions to bargaining problems without claims. We present several examples of reference functions that fulfill the conditions needed for the characterization results, but do not argue in favor of a particular function which would clearly go beyond the scope of this paper. For particular choices of the reference function we do not only recover well-known bargaining solutions including the Nash, egalitarian, KalaiSmorodinsky, equal-loss, proportional and claim-egalitarian solution, but we also find interesting new solution concepts.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the basic definitions. In Sects. 3, 4, and 5 we present the characterization results for egalitarian-, Nash-and proportional-type solutions, respectively. Section 6 concludes the paper with some final remarks.
Notation and definitions
In the following, N will denote the set of positive integers and R will denote the set of real numbers. By R n ; n 2 N; we denote the n-dimensional euclidean space. Vector inequalities in R n are denoted by !; >; ).
1 By R n þ and R n þþ we denote the set of nonnegative and strictly positive vectors in R n , respectively,
Convergence of a sequence of subsets of R n is defined in terms of the Hausdorff topology. By x Á y we denote the scalar product of x and y in 1 For x; y 2 R n we write x ! y if x i ! y i for all i, x > y if x ! y and x 6 ¼ y, and x ) y if
be the set of weakly Pareto optimal points in A and let
denote the set of Pareto optimal points in A. The set N ¼ f1; . . . ; ng; n 2 N; will denote the player set. If p : N ! N is a permutation, then p defines the mapping p : R n ! R n , which we denote by the same symbol, via
Let L be the class of all positive affine transformations on R n . For a set A & R n and L 2 L let LðAÞ ¼ fy j 9x 2 A with y ¼ LðxÞg. Bargaining problems were first studied by Nash [9] and are defined as follows.
Definition 2.1. An n-person bargaining problem is a tuple ðS; dÞ; where
A bargaining problem is characterized by a set S of feasible utility allocations, measured in von Neumann-Morgenstern scales, and a point d, called ''threatpoint'' or ''disagreement point'' or ''status quo,'' which is the outcome of the game if the players do not agree on a utility allocation in the feasible set. Thus, the status quo d can be unilaterally enforced by any player. Let R be the class of all n-person bargaining problems. A solution on a class of bargaining problems D & R is a mapping f : D ! R n such that f ðS; dÞ 2 S for all ðS; dÞ 2 D.
Consider now a bargaining situation in which the players have claims that are not compatible with each other. Assume that the claims are credible or verifiable and that all players agree that they should be taken into account by any (fair) solution to the problem at issue. The classic example for such a situation is a bankruptcy problem. While in the latter utility is transferable, general bargaining problems with claims, including those with nontransferable utility, were introduced by Chun and Thomson [3] . In the following sections we will study solutions for bargaining problems with and without claims.
Egalitarian-type solutions
Consider a reference function given by a mapping g : R c ! R n . As explained in the introduction a reference function is a means of summarizing ''essential'' features of a bargaining problem and a reference point will serve as an origin from which relative utility gains or losses are measured. Observe that we do not necessarily require the reference point to be a feasible utility allocation.
Let 
E1 is a weakening of the standard covariance with respect to positive affine transformations axiom. In a context, where utility is measured in von Neumann-Morgenstern utility scales and where there is interpersonal comparison of utility, we consider two bargaining problems as equivalent if one is obtained from the other by a shift in each player's origin of utility measurement. Thus, we would like the reference function to comply with such shifts, i.e., be covariant under translations. E2 and E3 are minimal technical requirements we have to impose on the reference function in order to obtain our characterization result below. It is understood that a reference function not satisfying these axioms can nevertheless be reasonable. Observe that we are not concerned with justifying or characterizing reference functions, which we take as exogenously given, but rather we aim at characterizing bargaining solutions that fulfill some properties with respect to a given reference function. 3 For further discussion we refer the reader to our concluding remarks in Sect. 6. Hence the axioms we impose upon the reference function are qualitatively different from the axioms we ask to be satisfied by a bargaining solution. All we have to make sure is that our axioms are satisfied by the common reference functions that have emerged in the literature, so that our characterization is not void. We will see later that this is indeed the case for the axioms we impose.
Consider the following axioms for a solution F :
( WPO is a standard axiom in bargaining theory and is certainly a minimal requirement for any reasonable solution. SY g is the symmetry axiom (cf. Nash [9] ) with the reference point substituted for the disagreement point. For an interpretation of TRANS, see our remarks about E1. Finally, RMON g is Kalai's [7] monotonicity axiom with the reference point substituted for the disagreement point. Consider the following solution on the class R c .
Definition 3.1. Let g : R c ! R n be a reference function. The egalitarian solution with respect to g is the function E g : R c ! R n ; given by
where " k ¼ maxfk 2 RjgðS; d; cÞ þ k e 2 Sg; ðS; d; cÞ 2 R c . Since for all ðS; d; cÞ 2 R c the set S is closed and comprehensive and the set fx 2 Sjx ! dg is bounded, E g is well defined on R c . If gðS; d; cÞ 2 S (gðS; d; cÞ = 2 S), then E g equalizes the gains (losses) from the reference point (see Fig. 1 ). 
where " k ¼ maxfk 2 RjgðS; dÞ þ k e 2 Sg; ðS; dÞ 2 R. The following result then immediately follows from Theorem 3.1, if one notes that, whenever In the following we present some examples of reference functions satisfying E1-E3. The first 2 examples give rise to well-known bargaining solutions while the last 3 examples lead to new solutions. Our characterization results above show that all solutions obey the same principles, the most prominent one being a monotonicity axiom, while they differ in the associated reference function.
For
For a ¼ 0 we find that E g 0 is the claim-egalitarian solution proposed by Bossert [1] . If we define the reference function g : R ! R n by gðS; dÞ ¼ d for all ðS; dÞ 2 R, then " g ¼ g 1 and e g is the egalitarian solution proposed by Kalai [7] .
Example 3.2. Let u : R ! R n be the reference function that assigns to each bargaining problem ðS; dÞ the utopia point uðS; dÞ. Then e u is the equal-loss solution proposed by Chun [2] . for ðS; dÞ 2 R. For two-person games the point of minimal expectations mðS; dÞ was introduced by Roth [11] . One can argue that for the resolution of the conflict the only relevant agreements are in that part of the Pareto frontier which dominates the disagreement point. Therefore, m i ðS; dÞ is the minimum player i can expect to achieve in the game ðS; dÞ 2 R. Observe that if ðS; dÞ 2 R is such that WPO ðSÞ \ IRðS; dÞ & POðSÞ, then mðS; dÞ ¼ d. It is straightforward to see that m satisfies E1, while E2 and E3 are satisfied only if n ¼ 2. 3) to the class of bargaining problems with claims. If any agreement is expected to be individually rational, bounded by the claims point and such that there are no further gains from cooperation, then M i ðS; d; cÞ is the minimum payoff player i a priori expects to achieve. Observe, however, that choosing MðS; d; cÞ as a reference point is not sufficient for the 4 If n ¼ 2 the reference point m uniquely defines two points on the relative boundary of the set of Pareto optimal and individually rational points, which is not the case in general. Therefore, the case n ¼ 2 is qualitatively different from the case n > 2. We already pointed out that originally m was only defined for two-person games (Roth [11] ). final agreement to be individually rational and bounded by the claims point. We discuss the issue of boundedness in Remark 3.1. For the same reason as in Example 3.3 conditions E2 and E3 can only be verified for n ¼ 2.
. . . ; n; 5 for ðS; d; cÞ 2 R c . The adjusted threatpoint tðS; d; cÞ is a minimally equitable agreement for a bargaining problem with claims, given that no player can expect someone else to settle with less than what is necessary to satisfy the claims of the other players, and given that no rational player will accept any payoff below the disagreement utility level. In the context of bankruptcy problems Curiel et al. [4] call t i ðS; d; cÞ the ''minimal right of claimant i.'' The adjusted threatpoint was also used by Herrero [6] to define the adjusted proportional rule as we will see in Sect. 5.
Remark 3.1. A major shortcoming of the egalitarian-type solutions is the fact that, in general, they do not satisfy boundedness, i.e. d E g ðS; d; cÞ c for all ðS; d; cÞ 2 R c . However, as it was already shown by Bossert [1] for the special case of the claim-egalitarian solution, E g can be modified in a straightforward way such as to satisfy boundedness.
To this end let g : R c ! R n be a reference function that satisfies d gðS; d; cÞ c for all ðS; d; cÞ 2 R n . If gðS; d; cÞ = 2 S, define the extended egalitarian solution with respect to g in an iterative way as follows. To simplify the notation, let g ¼ gðS; d; cÞ.
Otherwise, repeat the procedure until after
, in which case we define
Then, by definition d E g ðS; d; cÞ c. Analogously, we can define E g ðS; d; cÞ for gðS; d; cÞ 2 S such that E g ðS; d; cÞ is bounded by the disagreement and claims point. We omit the characterization of the extended egalitarian-type solutions which requires additional assumptions on the reference function and is straightforward but more involved than the characterization of the egalitarian-type solutions provided in this section (cf., Theorem 5 in Bossert [1] ). ¤ 5 For x 2 R n ; a 2 R, and i 2 f1; . . . ; ng, the vector a; x Ài ð Þ is defined to be the vector y 2 R n such that y i ¼ a and y j ¼ x j for all j 6 ¼ i. Also, by definition maxð;Þ ¼ À1. 6 For T & N let e T 2 R n be given by e T ð Þ i ¼ 1 if i 2 T , and e T ð Þ i ¼ 0 else.
Nash-type solutions
The result and method of this section are an adaptation of Thomson [12] to our context of bargaining problems with claims and n players. Analogous to [12] we impose the following axioms on the reference function g : 
N1 is a natural assumption for a reference function given that we want relative utility gains over (or losses from) the reference point to be covariant under equivalent utility representations. By comparison, N2 is a purely technical assumption (see our remarks about E2 and E3 in the last section). It requires that a bargaining problem with claims which already exhibits some symmetric structure (symmetric reference point and symmetric supporting hyperplane on the diagonal) can be replaced by a symmetric one without changing the essential features of the problem.
Together with WPO, and SY g the following conditions are the original Nash axioms (Nash [9] ) with the reference point substituted for the disagreement point (see also Thomson [12] ). Hence they require no further discussion. Fig. 2 ) is well defined since fx 2 Sjx ! gðS; d; cÞg is bounded for all ðS; d; cÞ 2 R c g . The following characterization of N g is an immediate adaptation of Thomson's result [12] to the domain of bargaining problems with claims. Hence we omit the proof which is analogous to Nash's own proof [9] . Again we present some examples of reference functions satisfying N1 and N2, some of which lead to well-known bargaining solutions.
Example 4.1. Consider the reference functions m : R ! R n and M : R c ! R n , defined in Examples 3.3 and 3.4, which assign to each bargaining problem the point of minimal expectations in the respective context. The solution m m was first studied by Roth [11] . In contrast to E2 and E3, N2 is satisfied by " m and M for all n. g ¼ g 1 and m g is the Nash solution (Nash [9] ).
Example 4.3. The adjusted threatpoint t : R c ! R n defined in Example 3.5 satisfies N1 and N2 and gives rise to the bargaining solution N t that has not been studied so far. 8 Thus, the reference function g assigns to any bargaining problem with claims not only a reference point g r ðS; d; cÞ but also a vector of weights g p ðS; d; cÞ. These weights can be interpreted as relative ''bargaining strengths'' of the players which are deduced from the bargaining game ðS; d; cÞ. 9 We will see later that several well-known bargaining solutions are defined with respect to this type of reference function.
We impose the following assumptions on g : ; cÞ, respectively. 8 k Á k denotes the euclidean norm in R n . 9 The type of reference function we consider here is in fact equivalent to a function which assigns to each bargaining problem with claims two reference points (a good example would be the status quo and the claims point). However, for technical reasons it is more convenient to work with the type of reference function defined before. P2 and P3 are the exact counterparts of E2 and E3 for the type of reference function we consider in this section. Similarly, P1 is the analogue of N1.
Observe that the covariance condition we impose upon g p ðÁÞ is very natural: the origin of utility measurement should not influence a player's relative bargaining strength, while if we scale up or down a player's utility by a given factor, then his relative bargaining strength should be scaled up or down accordingly.
Let where k ¼ kuðS; dÞ À dkwhich the reference points will lie. The main reason for this indeterminacy is that a reference function, in general, does not assign a weakly Pareto optimal outcome to a bargaining problem. Often the reference point is not even a feasible utility allocation. A different question is whether for a given bargaining solution there is a ''natural'' reference function that can be associated with the solution. These questions are left for future research.
